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Background: The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution methodology is used to formally investigate the nuclear
power dispute that took place in the Canadian province of Ontario in order to obtain strategic insights into its
resolution. This flexible systems methodology is used to study the nuclear conflict at two key points in time,
2008 and 2010.
Results: The results of the 2008 analysis show that the only decision makers involved in the conflict who hold real
power are the Federal and Ontario governments, although at the beginning of the investigation other
organizations had also been considered as participating decision makers. According to a strategic analysis carried
out for the conflict as it existed in 2010, the equilibria or potential resolutions of the 2008 analysis are found to
be transitional states leading to the 2010 resolution. Moreover, a negative attitude by the Federal Government
can cause an outcome to occur that is not highly preferred by either the Federal Government or the province
of Ontario.
Conclusions: By closely following the decision makers’ actions, a detailed analysis of the nuclear dispute in Ontario
is carried out. Stability, sensitivity, and attitude analyses are performed, and the results are closely correlated with
what happened in reality.
Keywords: Ontario nuclear power dispute, Graph model for conflict resolutionBackground
The conflict between the Federal Government of Canada
and the Ontario Provincial Government has been on-
going for the past couple of years. The Ontario Govern-
ment intends to expand the Darlington nuclear site and
plans to procure its reactors from Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL), the company responsible for
the building, maintenance, and management of CANDU
(CANada Deuterium Uranium) Canadian reactors.
Meanwhile, the Federal Government announced the
decision of restructuring and selling or privatizing
AECL. Nuclear technology has been very important to
Canada since its genesis. Huge investments have been
made in this industry by the Federal Government of
Canada over the years. If AECL is sold and the Ontario* Correspondence: kwhipel@uwaterloo.ca
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in any medium, provided the original work is pGovernment does not buy its reactors from this com-
pany, it is very possible that no other province will make
any purchases from AECL in the future.
CANDU reactors use a technology that is unique
among other reactors in the world, and their safety stan-
dards are very strict. On March 11, 2011, an earthquake
and tsunami occurred in Japan and caused serious dam-
age to the reactors in the affected region. One of the
main issues regarding Japanese reactors is that they emit
radioactive water, whereas in the CANDUs, the steam
and water in the secondary loops are not radioactive.
Therefore, in a critical event, when heat release is
required, the water in the secondary loop can be let out
with no damage to the environment, and new clean
water can be used. The other difference is that unlike
Japan, all CANDUs are located in areas where tsunamis
may not affect them, and environmental factors are
taken into careful consideration in the design of
CANDU reactors as well as advanced versions thereof
(Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 2011).n Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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would be a disaster for Canada to miss the opportunity
of pioneering this exclusive heavy water CANDU tech-
nology as well as other versions of its reactors. Experts
believe that whatever rearrangements in AECL manage-
ment take place, the involved parties have to make sure
that AECL remains a Canadian-owned company, or else
Canada will forfeit this historic opportunity for leader-
ship in nuclear technology, as occurred in the aircraft in-
dustry when Canada’s Avro Arrow aircraft technology
was destroyed (Hipel and Bowman, 2011). Considering
the importance of this technology and the conflict over
the Canadian nuclear industry, the key purpose of this
research is to model the aforementioned conflict by
using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR)
methodology. This approach realistically models the
conflict between two or more players having different
options under their control and preferences over what
could take place. This academic work is helpful to
researchers who would like to have an enhanced stra-
tegic understanding of the energy situation in Canada.
Moreover, since the analyzed conflict is still an ongoing
dispute in Canada, this study could be useful to decision
makers and stakeholders involved in the dispute. Follow-
ing an explanation of the history of the nuclear dispute,
the dispute is modelled and analyzed for the situations
existing in the years 2008 and 2010. The evolution of
the dispute over time, the influence of attitudes on the
potential resolution of the 2010 conflict, and other stra-
tegic insights are discussed. The application of GMCR to
this specific dispute constitutes the first application of
this kind of game theory technique to the Ontario nu-
clear dispute. In the next step, the conclusions are dis-
cussed, and finally, the methodology is explained.
Results and discussions
In this section, a brief introduction to the conflict is pro-
vided and the conflict in 2008 and 2010 are discussed,
and the results are explained.
Introduction to the conflict
In this paper, the Canadian nuclear conflict is modeled
with respect to two points in time. The first analysis was
conducted in 2008. This issue is an ongoing problem,
and the conflict has not been resolved. Since the first
analysis, some other related announcements and news
items have been published. Therefore, a second analysis
was performed in 2010, taking into consideration the
more recent information. Although the two analyses (ul-
timately) involve similar decision makers (DMs) and
options, they are different in terms of the relative prefer-
ences of the DMs. In each analysis, the DMs and their
options are introduced. After the feasible and indistin-
guishable states are determined, the relative preferencesfor each DM are defined. Then, static analysis and other
dynamic analyses are performed.
Canada has twenty-two CANDU reactors; twenty of
them are located in Ontario, the most populous prov-
ince, one in Quebec, and one in New Brunswick. Nu-
clear energy provides about 15 percent of Canada’s
electricity (AECL, 2008).
In the coming decades, the Liberal Government of
Ontario wants nuclear plants to remain the source of
half of Ontario’s electricity supply. It plans to install two
new nuclear reactors, which will provide up to 3,200
megawatts of electricity, and to expand the Darlington
nuclear site, in order to address the increasing demand
for electricity as well as to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. Although Dalton McGuinty, the Ontario
Premier, in his election campaign had promised to shut
down four coal-fired plants, which are highly polluting, by
2007, in 2006, he decided to postpone this plan to 2014,
because there was no proper replacement energy producer
(CBC News, 2006). At the beginning of March 2008,
Energy Minister Gerry Phillips officially announced that
the provincial government was seeking proposals to
build a new nuclear plant. He declared that construction
should begin in 2012 and electricity should be generated by
July 1, 2018 (Benzie and Black, 2008). Organizations that
submitted their proposals included AECL, Westinghouse
Electric Co. LLC, an American company, and Areva, a
French company (Frame, 2008).
As mentioned before, this conflict is analyzed with re-
spect to two different points in time. In the following
section, the dispute is explained according to the ana-
lyst’s information and available publications as of 2008.
It is worth noting that the present time in the following
section refers to the year 2008.
AECL’s reputation
Some incidents have aggravated the position of AECL in
this bidding competition and may prevent the Ontario
Government from selecting this company as the builder
of the new plant reactors.
1) The National Research Universal (NRU) Chalk River
reactor is the only nuclear reactor in North America
that supplies medical isotopes for molecular imaging,
radio therapeutics, and analytical instruments. On
November 18, 2007, the Canadian Nuclear Safety
Commission (CNSC) ordered the shutdown of the
reactor, because it found that AECL had been
operating the reactor for 17 months without a back-
up emergency power system for cooling pumps,
which prevent the reactor core from melting down.
In 2006, AECL was ordered by CNSC to upgrade the
NRU by installing that system. After two weeks of
shutdown, Michael Burns, the chairman of AECL at
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Minister of Canada, accepted his resignation and
blamed the Liberal-appointed CNSC for the closure.
He pushed an emergency measure through
Parliament on December 12, 2007, but the Liberals
opposed the measure. The Liberals feared that the
NRU was unsafe and required more upgrades.
Eventually, the reactor was restarted in late January
2008, when Harper fired Linda Keen, the CNSC’s
head, who was a Liberal committee member. The
outage created a critical and worldwide shortage of
the radioactive diagnostic material and is considered
a serious negative point in AECL’s history (CBC
News, 2008; Spears, 2008; Nathwani, 2009).
2) On May 16, 2008, AECL abandoned its plans to
complete Multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice
Experiment (MAPLE) reactors, which had been
started in 1996. These reactors were to serve as a
replacement for the NRU at Chalk River. In 2008,
the project was millions of dollars over budget and
eight years behind schedule. The failure of the
MAPLE reactors is a dark point for AECL and has
undermined its reputation. As a result of the failure
of this project, at the beginning of June 2008, MDS
Inc. launched a $1.6 billion lawsuit against AECL
(Akin, 2008; Hamilton, 2008b). Moreover, in an
expert panel report commissioned by Prime Minister
Harper, Goodhand et al. (2009) recommended that a
completely new and more flexible isotope reactor be
constructed.
3) The safety standards are another problem. After
September 11, 2001, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) established guidelines
mandating that reactor builders redesign reactors so
that they have the ability to withstand a massive
outside shock or explosion. These safety standards
must be applied to all new reactor designs. As
AECL’s reactors do not meet these standards, new
regulations could be a major setback for AECL. Jerry
Hopwood, vice-president of reactor development at
AECL, has accepted the design weaknesses, stating
that they would design an advanced CANDU 6 or
adapt the old one if needed, to meet the standards a
(Hamilton, 2007).
The federal Government’s view towards AECL
In light of the problems pertaining to AECL, the Federal
Government wants to enhance its nuclear credibility.
Gary Lunn, Natural Resources Minister at the time, said
that it is “imperative” that Ontario purchase new reac-
tors from AECL (Geddes, 2007). Although Harper’s gov-
ernment comprehends the importance of AECL as a
federal Crown corporation, it does not completely sup-
port AECL’s efforts to regain its previous reputation.Harper’s government has declared that in order to fulfill
the country’s growing electricity demands and facilitate
the development of Canadian nuclear technology, the
government has to decide about AECL’s current status.
The Conservatives are looking at different business mod-
els for AECL, including the sale of ownership stocks to
one of several companies that have expressed interest,
such as Westinghouse Electric Co. and France’s Areva,
foreign companies, and Bruce Power Inc., a Canadian
company. Natural Resources Minister Lunn said that
AECL’s status is under review, stating that they are con-
sidering all options, from the status quo to a partnership
with private investors to a sale to a foreign government.
Another incentive for the Federal Government to change
the status of AECL is the reliance of AECL’s develop-
ment program on federal tax dollars. Since, as men-
tioned above, AECL has incurred budget overruns, the
sale of its stocks to a private company could alleviate
taxpayers’ criticisms of the Federal Government. On the
other hand, industry observers say the lawsuit pertaining
to the MAPLE reactors will make it more difficult for
Ottawa to find a private suitor for AECL. This increases
the probability that the government will opt to sell
AECL to a foreign company or government (Hamilton,
2008b; Puxley, 2007). However, AECL does not want to
be privatized. Its spokesman, Dale Coffin, disputed sug-
gestions that AECL needs a strategic private-sector part-
ner to compete in the world.
The Federal Government vs. The Ontario Government
On the other side of the conflict, the Ontario Govern-
ment is dealing with its own issues. Premier McGuinty
stated: “The Ontario Government is unwilling to pur-
chase new reactors from AECL unless it receives assur-
ance that the Federal Government will remain the
ultimate backer of AECL”. The McGuinty government is
concerned about AECL’s history and has made it clear
that while it would prefer to buy home-grown technol-
ogy, it is open to purchasing from a foreign company if
it means getting the best deal for Ontario’s taxpayers. If
Ottawa does not support AECL, it will be very hard for
it to sell the reactors in Ontario, and if it cannot do so,
it will face a difficult time selling them anywhere else in
the world (Hamilton, 2007).
In addition, timing and financial issues affect the Lib-
eral Government’s decision. McGuinty has promised to
shut down all the province’s coal-powered plants by
2014. New nuclear plants would be completed by 2018 if
everything goes according to schedule. Furthermore,
construction of a nuclear plant requires huge invest-
ments and compels Ontario’s taxpayers to bear a heavy
tax burden. Therefore, the Ontario Government wants
AECL to be fully financially supported by the Federal
Government. The provincial government is in an urgent
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It is unable to wait a very long time for AECL to prove
its qualifications, but has to make its decision by March
2009 at the latest (Hamilton, 2008b; McParland, 2008).
Green groups of Canada
The Green Party of Canada, along with other green orga-
nizations and environmental groups, and the New Demo-
cratic Party (NDP) of Canada are on the other side of the
conflict. They have always opposed the use of nuclear en-
ergy and believe that the Federal Government does not in-
vest sufficiently in renewable energies. They think Canada
has enough clean energy resources and does not need nu-
clear plants. These groups do not consider nuclear energy
a clean energy, because there is still no proper means of
nuclear waste management. They express their disagree-
ment through their websites, articles, and speeches. Green
groups are also concerned about the costs and consider
nuclear energy generation to be expensive. Hence, in this
dispute, green groups would agree with privatizing or sell-
ing AECL, as there would then be no need for the Federal
Government to spend much money on AECL’s funding,
and taxpayers will not suffer. It would furthermore be eas-
ier for green groups to oppose AECL as a private nuclear
organization, as it would not have governmental support
(New Democratic Party, 2008; Sierraclub, 2008; Harris,
2008).
Analysis in 2008
The state of the conflict in 2008
AECL is in trouble; it has not sold a single reactor in
ten years (by 2008). A new president was appointed in
December 2007 to change the situation and return it to
its once leading position in the nuclear industry. In the
February federal budget, it received an appropriation of
$300 million to support research and develop new tech-
nology. However, AECL still cannot convince the Ontario
Government to buy its advanced reactors. A few key
factors can possibly change AECL’s situation. In June
2008, AECL announced that it had signed an agreement
with the Nuclear Power Institute of China to collaborate
on the “design, research, development, and demonstra-
tion” of “low uranium consumption CANDU technolo-
gies”. Moreover, AECL is working with South Korea on
a process called “direct use of spent pressurized water
reactor fuel in CANDUs” (DUPIC). DUPIC is unique
and can give Canada the opportunity to solve many pro-
blems in a nuclear energy market increasingly domi-
nated by light-water reactors. DUPIC also gives existing
and new CANDU 6 reactors a chance to minimize the
environmental risks. As nuclear experts point out, the
existence of the DUPIC project alone gives the Federal
Government a new option to give AECL another
chance. It could be a point of strength for the company.If AECL accomplishes good results with these projects
and keeps achieving satisfactory contracts, it might
change the Federal and Provincial Governments’ views
(Hamilton, 2008a).
Different parties and groups in Canada are concerned
about AECL’s future. Ontario Energy Minister Duncan
believes that AECL would be worth far less if Ottawa
privatized it. If AECL were sold to a foreign company,
thousands of skilled workers would lose their jobs at a
time when the province has already lost thousands of in-
dustrial jobs.Decision makers, options, states and relative preferences
According to the background of the conflict, the DMs of
the dispute are listed below:
 The Federal Government
 The Ontario Government
 AECL
 Green Groups
Hereinafter, FG, OG, and GG denote Federal Govern-
ment of Canada, Ontario Government, and Green
groups, respectively.
The four aforementioned DMs and their options, and
the current state of the conflict are shown in Table 1. In
order to better represent and discriminate states, each
state is defined as follows:
si ¼ x1x2x3; x4x5; x6; x7ð Þ; xj∈ Y ;Nf g; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 7;
where x1x2x3 are the options that belong to FG, x4x5 be-
long to OG, x6 belongs to AECL, and x7 belongs to GG.
In addition, xj = Y indicates that the j-th option is
chosen and xj = N indicates that it is not. It is a large
conflict, so GMCR II software developed by the Conflict
Analysis Group in the Department of Systems Design
Engineering at the University of Waterloo (Fang et al.,
2003a,b; Hipel et al., 1997) was used to perform various
types of analyses.
The infeasible states are also determined. These states
must be eliminated from the analysis. A number of in-
feasible states are observed in this conflict, and after re-
moving those states, 48 states remain.
 The options of the Federal Government and the
Ontario Government are mutually exclusive.
Therefore, considering the options mentioned in
Table 1, the states listed below should be removed:– Federal Government: (Y Y -, - -, -, -), (Y - Y, - -,
-, -), and (- Y Y, - -, -, -)
– Ontario Government: (- - -, Y Y, -, -)
Table 1 DMs and options in 2008 analysis
DMs Options Status
Quo
Federal Government (FG) 1. Sell less than 50% of AECL’s
stocks, and keep control of it
N
2. Sell or privatize AECL N
3. Fully support AECL N
Ontario Government (OG) 4. Buy reactors from AECL N
5. Buy reactors from a foreign
company
N
AECL 6. Convince both governments
that it is capable of fulfilling its
mandates
N
Green Groups (GG) 7. Continue their protests against
nuclear power
Y
Table 2 The option prioritization table for the Federal
Government (FG)
Preference Statements Explanation
-3 The most important thing for FG is not to
support AECL, and not to invest more
money into it.
2 Next, FG prefers to privatize AECL.
-1 & -2 & -3 & 4 FG mostly prefers that OG buys its reactors
from AECL.
-1 & -2 & -3 & -4 & -5 It prefers that both governments take
no action.
2 & 4 Next, it prefers to privatize AECL and prefers
OG to buy its reactors from AECL.
1 & 4 Next, it would like to sell less than half of
AECL’s stocks and OG to buy its reactors
from AECL.
3 & 4 & -5 After that, it prefers the case that it supports
AECL, and OG buys its reactors from AECL.
3 & -4 & -5 It next prefers the situation in which it
supports AECL, and OG waits.
-1 & -2 & -3 if 5 If OG makes a foreign purchase, FG prefers
to do nothing.
6 Redesigning the reactors by AECL is one
of its least priorities.
-7 AECL working on the DUPIC project is also
of less importance for FG.
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preferences of the three DMs are determined using the
option prioritizing method (Explained in Methods).
Some explanations are provided and used to form the
relative preferences.
 The Federal Government (FG) is contemplating the
future of AECL: To sell less than 50% of AECL, sell
it all or privatize it, or support it. However, its
negotiations are not clear to other parties and to the
public. The Federal Government prefers AECL
reactors be sold to Ontario, so that AECL can gain
credit to sell more reactors to other countries.
After the states presenting this situation, the Federal
Government next prefers the states in which neither the
Federal nor the Ontario Government take any action.
The Federal Government would prefer to sell AECL if it
is faced with complaints from taxpayers or the Ontario
Government. The least favoured states for this DM are
the ones that represent the support of AECL by the Fed-
eral Government. Table 2 demonstrates the specific way
that state prioritization is managed in GMCR II for FG.
In this table, preference statements are listed from most
important at the top to least important at the bottom.
The numbers in the left column of Table 2 refer to the
option numbers given in Table 1, where a negative sign
means that the option is not taken. Notice that the most
important preference for the Federal Government is not
to fully support AECL by not taking option 3 (denoted
by −3). Assuming transitive or ordinal preferences, an al-
gorithm can take the prioritized preference statements
of the Federal Government in Table 1 and rank the
states from most to least preferred where ties are
allowed.
 The Ontario Government (OG) most prefers to
select home-grown technology if AECL is successfulin the redesign process. In addition, it would prefer
that the Federal Government supports AECL. AECL
being supported by FG is much more important to
OG than redesigning CANDU reactors. It expects
the Federal Government to support AECL in
completing its projects on schedule. Next, it prefers
the future of AECL to be resolved and to buy
reactors from this company when AECL is trusted.
As the Ontario Government does not want to waste
time, it would rather purchase reactors from a
foreign company if the future of AECL is
undetermined.
 AECL is trying to complete its projects in order not
to be sold. The most desirable states for AECL are
the ones in which AECL is not sold. Among these
states, it is more preferable for AECL to be
supported, and it is also very important for AECL to
sell its reactors to the Ontario Government.
 Green Groups (GG) are against nuclear energy.
They declare their opposition via speeches and
websites.
Static analysis
The equilibrium states (along with their corresponding
stability types) determined by running the stability ana-
lysis in GMCR II are listed horizontally as:
 (N Y N, N N, N, Y): state 27, GMR, SMR,
Table 3 Evolution of the conflict
Federal Government
1. Sell less than 50%
of AECL
N N N N N
2. Privatize AECL N N N FG Y Y
→
3. Support AECL N N N N N
Ontario Government
4. Buy from AECL N N OG Y Y OG N
→ →
5. Buy from a foreign
company
N N N N N
AECL
6. Satisfy FG and OG N AECL Y Y Y -
→
Green Groups
7. Protest Y Y Y Y Y
25 37 29 43 27&39
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 (N Y N, Y N, Y, Y): state 43, Nash, GMR, SMR,
SEQ.
These states indicate what actually took place in real-
ity. State 43 is the most stable equilibrium state, as its
stability type is Nash, which also means that state 43 is
equilibrium according to SEQ, GMR, and SMR. Because
43 is Nash equilibrium, no DM can unilaterally move to
a more preferred state from state 43. States 27 and 39
are also equilibria in this conflict, but only according to
SMR and GMR stability, which means sanctioning DMs
can move to less preferred states when blocking the
given DM’s unilateral improvement, which is a move-
ment by a DM to a more preferred state. What hap-
pened in reality (as of 2010) is that the Ontario
Government chose AECL as the vendor of the reactors,
and then the Federal Government decided to attempt to
privatize AECL. After this decision was made, the On-
tario Government postponed the purchase of the two
reactors, because the future of AECL was very uncertain.
Therefore, the state that took place was state 43, but
states 27 and 39, which can be presented as (N Y N, Y
N, N -, Y), happened after state 43, where a dash means
Y or N. Also, since states 27 and 39 are only GMR and
SMR equilibria, the stability of these states is not as
strong as an SEQ equilibrium in which the sanctions by
other DMs against unilateral improvements by a focal
DM can only be levied using unilateral improvements.
Here, one may conclude that neither state 27 nor state
39 are the final equilibria of the conflict, so the dispute
will not finish at this point.
Status Quo analysis
To apply status quo analysis, the current state of the
conflict has to be determined. Next, the analyst investi-
gates the way the conflict has evolved from its initial
state in 2008. In the current state of the conflict, FG and
OG are not taking any action; AECL is working on the
DUPIC project and on the design of Advanced CANDU
Reactors (ACRs), and consequently, trying to satisfy its
customer, OG, and its owner, FG (option 7); and GG is
protesting. This set of options represents the status quo
state 25 (N N N, N N, N, Y). In this case, the game
develops from state 25 (N N N, N N, N, Y) to states 43,
27, and 39. The evolution of the conflict is shown in
Table 3. In each level, one DM can move the conflict
from the existing state to another state. The arrows,
along with an assigned DM, show which DM is moving
the conflict.
Although it is shown that the 2008 conflict will finish
at states 27 and 39 (which is what happened in reality),
later the authors show that in fact the conflict will again
move to state 43, and states 27 and 39 are the transitionstates in the 2010 conflict. It should be noted that the
number assigned to each state is not the same in the
2008 and 2010 conflicts.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to gain more insights, some sensitivity analyses
have been run. Sensitivity analyses can help the analyst
to have a better understanding of the conflict and the
static analysis. For example, in this conflict, it seems that
although the Green Groups, GG, have an option to pro-
test against the investment in and the use of nuclear en-
ergy, they are not as powerful as the other three DMs.
The main reason for this is that all the other DMs, in
contrast to GG, are in favour of nuclear energy. It seems
logical that the fourth DM, being the only anti-nuclear
DM, does not have a considerable effect on the result of
the conflict. To see how much this anticipation is cor-
rect, GG is omitted from the game, and another static
analysis is executed, and the equilibrium states are
shown below:
 (N Y N, N N, N): state 3, GMR, SMR,
 (N Y N, N N, Y): state 15, GMR, SMR, and
 (N Y N, Y N, Y): state 19, Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ.
These equilibria verify the aforementioned expectation,
as the indicated results are essentially the same as the
results in the previous analysis. Option prioritization
tables show that the decision of GG regarding whether
to protest or not is among the least important issues for
all DMs except for GG. Therefore, the results show that
GG is not an important DM in this conflict. In other
words, GG cannot significantly influence the other DMs’
decisions regarding the future of AECL.
Armin et al. Environmental Systems Research 2012, 1:11 Page 7 of 16
http://www.environmentalsystemsresearch.com/content/1/1/11Another idea is to eliminate AECL as well. Although it
might seem that AECL’s attempt to obtain the trust of
FG and OG would affect the decisions of those two
DMs, it is possible that their decisions are independent
of AECL’s achievements. If this possibility is in fact true,
AECL would not actually be a DM in the conflict, and
only the two governments would be important DMs.
Thus, if AECL were to be omitted from the analysis, and
AECL is not a DM of any real consequence in the con-
flict, the two equilibria one would expect to obtain
would be: (N Y N, Y N), which would be equivalent to
state 43, and (N Y N, N N), which is the same as states
27 and 39. The related analysis results verify the fact that
AECL is not an influential DM. The resulting equilib-
rium states for this analysis are shown below:
 (N Y N, N N): state 3, GMR, SMR,
 (N Y N, Y N): state 7, Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ.
In order to more deeply investigate the effect of AECL
as a DM on the results of the modeling, the preferences
of this DM are changed. If AECL is not significantly
affecting the game, changing its preferences should not
change the equilibria regarding the future of this com-
pany. This change is applied to the game with three
DMs, in which only GG is omitted. Different arrange-
ments of AECL’s relative preferences are made at this
level. The results show that the equilibria do not change,
although their types do with some changes in the rela-
tive preferences. Therefore, one may conclude that
AECL does not, in fact, have a considerable effect on the
other two DMs.
Finally, since only two DMs are found to be influential
in this conflict, the status quo table is reproduced to
show the evolution of this smaller conflict (Table 4).
Analysis in 2010
Previously, the Ontario nuclear dispute was analyzed for
2008. This dispute, however, is an ongoing conflict in
the province. Therefore, in the following sections, an at-
tempt is made to perform a new GMCR analysis of theTable 4 Evolution of the 2-DM 2008 conflict
Federal Government
1. Sell less than 50% of AECL N N N N
2. Privatize AECL N N FG Y Y
→
3. Support AECL N N N N
Ontario Government
4. Buy from AECL N OG Y Y OG N
→ →
5. Buy from a foreign company N N N N
1 5 7 3same conflict, but with an updated background. In
addition, regarding energy issues in the province, the
Government of Ontario has recently published an
updated energy report (Ontario Government, 2010).
Updated background of the conflict
To summarize the history of the conflict in 2010, and to
update the background of the dispute in 2008, the timeline
of the nuclear project is described as follows (Ontario
Government, 2009). In March 2008, the Ontario Govern-
ment announced a two-phase competitive procurement
process to choose a preferred nuclear reactor vendor.
After holding a series of confidential meetings with the
vendors in June 2008, Infrastructure Ontario announced
that all three vendors that had submitted Phase 1 Proposal
Submissions received ‘satisfactory’ ratings and would
be invited to proceed to Phase 2 of the Request For
Proposal (RFP). Subsequently, Infrastructure Ontario
released Phase 2 of the Nuclear Procurement Project
RFP. At this stage, and in November 2008, the first ana-
lysis was performed. From February to May 2009, all
three respondents submitted Phase 2 Proposals, and
the Government of Canada announced that it was pro-
ceeding with a restructuring of AECL. In June 2009, the
Ontario Government announced that the Nuclear Pro-
curement Project RFP was being suspended due to con-
cerns about pricing and uncertainty regarding AECL’s
future.
The Centre for International Governance Innovation
(CIGI) published an important report in November
2009. This report studies the nuclear industry in Ontario
and briefly investigates the expansion of the Darlington
nuclear site, the most important nuclear project in
Canada. The report stated that by 2008, Ontario had
planned to invest $40 billion to replace and refurbish its
nuclear generating capacity, and subsequently, in February
2009, bids to build a new facility at Darlington were
accepted by the province (Cadham, 2009).
The CANDU design, proposed by AECL, is proudly
Canadian in that Team CANDU represents the provider
of Ontario’s existing installed nuclear facilities. The
AECL CANDU design was the only design to fully meet
the requirements of Infrastructure Ontario among the
three vendors, consisting of AECL, Areva Group and
Westinghouse Electric Co. Hence, for this and other rea-
sons, the province selected AECL’s technology as the
winner.
In July 2009, George Smitherman, the Energy Minister
of Ontario, said that the government wanted to negotiate
with Ottawa to reduce the bidding price. Smitherman
declared that AECL’s bid was “billions” above what
Ontario had anticipated. Ontario Power Generation
(OPG) had estimated the cost of the installation of the
two ACRs at $3,000 per kilowatt, compared to $10,800,
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the offer being this high is that the design of the ACR is
not yet complete, but Ontario is disinclined to pay for
the cost of the research and development (R&D)
process. On the other hand, before the offer was submit-
ted by AECL, the Harper government had told the com-
pany that its bidding price must cover all the costs of
R&D, and that AECL should not count on future sales
to put off the cost overruns. In the case in which the
Federal Government decides to keep AECL as a federal
Crown corporation and not sell it, the government needs
to ensure that the Ontario nuclear project is commercia-
lized in an attempt to preserve AECL’s value and to
avoid federal taxpayers subsidizing Ontario ratepayers
(McCarthy and Howlett, 2009).
The AECL’s restructuring is currently under scrutiny.
In 2007, the Federal Government hired the National
Bank to provide independent financial advice and to
help find the best way to carry out the mandates of
AECL. The National Bank put forward some solid
recommendations. In its recommendations, it was sug-
gested that AECL has two concurrent mandates: com-
mercial goals involving the selling and servicing of
reactors, and R&D with regards to projects and technol-
ogy. The bank advised that at least 51% of AECL be sold
and encouraged the Government of Ottawa to improve
AECL’s standing in the international market. Natural
Resources Canada published a report in May 2009 to
present the ideas they received from the National Bank
and other consultants. AECL’s failure in handling its pro-
jects shows that in the past, the two opposing mandates
have not worked well together, and AECL has fallen
short on many of its objectives. Some of AECL’s unsuc-
cessful projects were mentioned above. The former
Minister of Natural Resources, Lisa Raitt, advised: “The
best chance to take advantage of this nuclear renaissance
is to divide the two of them and seek global participa-
tion.” Raitt suggested that the designing and building of
reactors is very expensive, and Canadian taxpayers can-
not shoulder this burden on their own, so AECL needs a
strategic alliance in order to compete in the world (CTV,
2009). As stated in the project procurement, the Gov-
ernment of Canada announced the restructuring of
AECL in May 2009. It also hired N.M. Rothschild &
Sons to provide financial advice and available options
and received their financial analysis on the restructuring
plan of AECL in October 2009, but the report is confi-
dential due to commercial confidentiality considerations.
As stated by Raitt, the company’s research-and-
development division, Chalk River laboratories, will con-
tinue to be government-owned, but with private-sector
management (CBC News, 2009). The reactor business
and its attractive maintenance and refurbishment activ-
ities would then be offered for sale on either a majorityor minority ownership. Some parties accuse the govern-
ment of wanting to sell AECL in order to balance its
budget deficit. According to the former Minister of Nat-
ural Resources, however, this decision is about bolstering
the industry. However, this reconstruction is not desired
by the Ontario Government as stated by Smitherman:
“The government of Canada needs to do the work that
they are doing now to clarify the future ownership of
AECL, and when they have clarified that, to sharpen
their pencils substantially so that the people of the prov-
ince of Ontario can renew their nuclear fleet with two
new units from that company” (McCarthy and Howlett,
2009).
Having discussed the points of view of the two govern-
ments, it can be concluded that Ontario will not move
until Ottawa clarifies AECL’s ownership status. The
other key issue is AECL’s bidding price. Thus, the uncer-
tain future of AECL and the high price were two import-
ant factors that led Ontario to postpone the project.
According to the background information, it is nonethe-
less clear that Ontario mostly prefers to buy reactors
from AECL.
The government of Canada, on the other hand, can
decide between several options: privatizing and restruc-
turing AECL, selling it to a Canadian or a foreign cor-
poration, or keeping it public and consequently helping
AECL to decrease the price. It has been a long time
since the announcement of selling AECL, but it has not
yet happened. Therefore, there is still the possibility that
the government will not privatize the federal Crown cor-
poration. Industry insiders say that the companies that
are interested in partnership with AECL are an inter-
national company, US-based Westinghouse Electric Co.,
Canadian engineering giant SNC-Lavalin Group Inc.,
and Bruce Power, a Canadian-owned consortium that
operates a nuclear station in Ontario. The bidding
process closed on June 30, 2010 (The Globe and Mail,
2010). Sources close to negotiations say that only SNC-
Lavalin Group Inc. and Bruce Power have submitted
their bids to partner with AECL (McCarthy, 2010). What
happened in reality was that in June 2011, the Ottawa
government announced the sale of AECL to SNC-
Lavalin Group Inc. (McCarthy, 2011).
Since there is opposition against selling or privatizing
AECL, this decision is not an easy one for the govern-
ment to undertake (The Star, 2009). AECL possesses an
internationally competitive reactor design and employs
thousands of Canadian workers, and AECL’s supporters
argue that it is not beneficial for the governments to let
this company be sold. Canadian nuclear analyst David
Jackson says that the problem with dividing AECL into
two parts and privatizing one of them is that “no poten-
tial purchaser would want to buy an ACR with no
assured R&D backup and thus, in effect the
Table 5 DMs and options in 2010 Analysis
DMs Options
Federal Government 1. Sell AECL (to a foreign company)
2. Sell AECL (to a Canadian company)
3. Support AECL
Ontario Government 4. Buy from a foreign company
5. Buy from AECL
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the other hand, the Federal Government’s supporters be-
lieve that selling AECL is a sound decision as this com-
pany has been a burden on taxpayers for a long time
and it has not been a cost-efficient investment. In
addition, they think selling to a foreign company, rather
than a Canadian company, would be a much better deci-
sion. A domestic sale will not change the pressure on
taxpayers. Furthermore, selling AECL to a domestic
buyer will not help the company to regain its reputation
and become a competitive player in the international
market (McCarthy, 2010).
There are also other provinces, such as New Brunswick
and Saskatchewan, that have indicated an interest in buy-
ing new reactors. In July 2010, however, New Brunswick
announced that it would not choose AECL as the provider
of its reactors, and is instead turning to Areva Group,
which is a company that was interested in buying AECL,
but dropped out from the bidding. This decision, along
with what happened in the Ontario contract, are consid-
ered major setbacks for AECL, and complicate the deci-
sion of the Federal Government regarding selling off
AECL (The Globe and Mail, 2010). AECL was counting
on the Darlington project to galvanize its huge resources
to launch its new Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR).
Therefore, in the end, if Ontario, as the largest customer,
decides not to buy any reactor at all, it would be unlikely
that other provinces would consider AECL’s unproven,
first-of-its-kind ACR technology as a serious option.
The problem gets more complicated when one consid-
ers the massive amount of money that Ontario has spent
on its nuclear industry. It operates more CANDU reactors
than all of the other Canadian provinces or countries
combined. Moreover, AECL has about 5000 employees,
and privatizing it will lead to a large number of job losses,
which is not desired by any of the DMs or the political
parties in the country (McCarthy and Howlett, 2009).
Decision makers, options, states and relative preferences
In the 2010 analysis, there are only two DMs, the Federal
and Ontario Governments. According to the updated
background, neither AECL nor the Green Groups are im-
portant DMs. Consequently, their decisions do not affect
the final decision that the Federal and Ontario Govern-
ments will make (Cadham, 2009). Since it is the responsi-
bility of the Federal Government to financially support
AECL, if this government does not provide sufficient
funding for the company, the possibility that AECL can
compete with its foreign rivals and win the contract
becomes very low. The other DM that can seriously affect
the outcome of the conflict and the future of AECL is the
Ontario Government. Although AECL’s suggested bidding
price for the expansion of Ontario’s nuclear power stations
is very high, if the Ontario Government accepts AECL’soffer, it is possible that AECL could remain as a public
company. Regarding the DUPIC project, which AECL is
working on, the published news and interviews of the offi-
cials of the two governments do not indicate that they pay
much attention to the performance of AECL on this pro-
ject. The Federal and Ontario Governments are more con-
cerned about AECL’s progress in building and selling
reactors. Therefore, in the 2010 analysis, there are only two
main DMs, the Federal Government and the Ontario Gov-
ernment. Regarding the options for the two governments,
Table 5 shows the options for each DM. As can be seen,
the options for each DM change with respect to the previ-
ous analysis in 2008, shown in the upper part of Table 1.
In the most recent analysis (2010), the first two
options of the Federal Government change from what
they were in 2008, since in 2010, it is determined that if
the Federal Government decides to restructure AECL, it
will privatize it, and not sell only less than half of its
stocks. The options, however, are selling to a domestic
or an international organization. The reason for this is
that, in practice, the Federal Government is studying the
privatization of one part, R&D, and selling the other
part, CANDU. The Ontario Government has the same
options as in 2008. However, after examining the ven-
dors’ bids, the province recognized that if the final deci-
sion is to buy new reactors, the vendor would definitely
be AECL, so its option to purchase reactors from a for-
eign company would be essentially eliminated. Taking
into consideration the latest announcements and the
updated background, as well as the options, the relative
preferences of the DMs will also change.
Regarding the infeasible states, the options for the two
DMs are mutually exclusive. The Federal Government
cannot privatize and support AECL at the same time.
Similarly, the Ontario Government cannot choose its
two options simultaneously. Therefore, the following in-
feasible states are removed from the game, and 12 feas-
ible states remain, which are shown in Table 6.
 FG: (Y Y -, - -), (Y - Y, - -), (- Y Y, - -)
 OG: (- - -, Y Y)
Rather than using option prioritization to determine
the relative preferences of the second DM, as was done
Table 7 Direct ranking box in GMCR II for the Federal
Government
Federal Government
1. Sell AECL (to a
foreign company)
N Y N Y N N Y N N N N N
2. Sell AECL (to a
Canadian company)
Y N N N Y N N Y N N N N
3. Support AECL N N N N N N N N N Y Y Y
Ontario Government
4. Buy from a foreign
company
N N N N N N Y Y Y N N Y
5. Buy from AECL Y Y Y N N N N N N Y N N
State Number 11 10 9 2 3 1 6 7 5 12 4 8
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whereby the states are ranked from most to least pre-
ferred by the analyst. This method works well for small
conflicts, such as the small 12-state conflict considered
here. In Tables 7 and 8, the ranking of states for the Fed-
eral and Ontario Governments are directly defined.
Static analysis
After defining the DMs, their options and preferences,
static analysis is performed to investigate the final pos-
sible outcomes. States 1 and 11 are found to be the equi-
libria of the conflict. The equilibria in this case are
shown below. It is worth noting that in order to find the
equilibria, Sequential and Nash stability are considered.
 (N N N, N N): state 1, SEQ,
 (Y N N, N Y): state 11, Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ.
It should be noted that by DMs being conservative,
more states are stable, and the uncertainty of the game
rises. In other words, if the DMs are very conservative,
other concepts of stability should be considered. The
reason for this is that if the DMs refrain from moving to
different states on account of the possibility of losing
benefits, the conflict will stop in more states and there
will be more equilibria, compared with the situation in
which the DMs accept the risks and move from one
state to another. However, in this specific conflict the
DMs are not conservative. As an example, more than a
year ago, the Federal Government announced the re-
structuring AECL, but it has not yet sold it. In addition,
Ontario Government announced AECL to be the best
company, but postponed its decision about buying reac-
tors from it. These examples show that the DMs do
accept some risks and do move from state to state.
Therefore, GMR and SMR stability concepts are ignored,
and SEQ and Nash stability are being considered.
As of July 2011, what happened in reality was that the
commercial reactor business of AECL was sold to SNC-
Lavalin, a Montreal-based company. Specifically, on June
27, 2011, Ottawa announced the sale of the reactorTable 6 List of feasible states
Federal Government
1. Sell AECL (to a
foreign company)
N Y N N N Y N N N Y N N
2. Sell AECL (to a
Canadian company)
N N Y N N N Y N N N Y N
3. Support AECL N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
Ontario Government
4. Buy from a foreign
company
N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N
5. Buy from AECL N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y
State Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12business of AECL to this Canadian company for $15
million. This change in ownership will cause a loss of
jobs in Ontario: 1,200 out of about 2,000 employees at
AECL’s commercial division will move to the new
CANDU Energy division of SNC-Lavalin in Quebec
(Babbage, 2011; McCarthy, 2011). Although Ontario’s
decision to buy two new Enhanced CANDU 6 reactors
has not yet been officially announced, the analysis results
of this paper are in fact very close to what happened in
the real world. In particular, state 11, the equilibrium of
the conflict, represents the situation in which AECL is
sold to a Canadian company (corresponding with SNC-
Lavalin’s ownership of CANDU Energy), and Ontario
buys two new reactors from AECL.
Since this conflict is not very big, the static analysis
can also be performed by hand without the software.
The reachable list is shown in Table 9. In Table 10, the
states are ranked from most to least preferred for each
DM. The unilateral improvements are listed under each
state for each DM. The type of stability for a given state
and DM is written above the state in the ranking of
states for the DM. In Table 10, the letters r, s, and u
stand for rational stability, sequential stability (SEQ),
and unstable, respectively. When a state is stable for all
of the DMs, it is an equilibrium indicated by E. Notice,Table 8 Direct ranking box in GMCR II for the Ontario
Government
Federal Government
1. Sell AECL (to a
foreign company)
N N N Y N N Y N Y N N N
2. Sell AECL (to a
Canadian company)
N N Y N N Y N Y N N N N
3. Support AECL Y N N N N N N N N Y Y N
Ontario Government
4. Buy from a foreign
company
N N N N Y Y Y N N N Y N
5. Buy from AECL Y N Y Y N N N N N N N Y
State Number 12 1 11 10 5 7 6 3 2 4 8 9
Table 10 Stability analysis
Overall Equilibria E × × × × E × × × × × ×
Individual Stability r u u r s s s r u u u u
FG State Ranking 11 10 9 2 3 1 6 7 5 12 4 8
11 10 2 3 6 7 9 1 5
11 2 6 11 2 6
10 3 7
Individual Stability r r r r s u u u u u u u
OG State Ranking 12 1 11 10 5 7 6 3 2 4 8 9
1 11 10 7 6 12 4 1
11 10 12 5
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written below it for both FG and OG. Therefore, the
state is rational (r) for each DM and constitutes an over-
all equilibrium (E). State 1 is sequentially stable (s) for
FG since both of its unilateral improvements can be
blocked by OG. In particular, if FG moves from state 1
to 3, OG can then move from state 3 to 7, which is less
preferred to state 1 by FG. Likewise, if FG moves from
state 1 to 2, then OG can move from 2 to 6, which is
less preferred to state 1 by FG. Since both unilateral
improvements by FG from state 1 can be blocked by
OG, state 1 is sequentially stable (s) for FG. Moreover,
because state 1 is rational (r) for OG, it forms an overall
equilibrium (E).
According to the definitions provided in the last sec-
tion (Methods) regarding stability concepts, Nash and
SEQ equilibria are found and shown in Table 10. State 1,
where no DM takes any action, is one of the equilibria.
This is a reasonable solution, since for a long time, the
governments did not announce any specific decision. Al-
though the Federal Government had announced the re-
structuring, as of May 2011, FG had not introduced the
purchaser. The Ontario Government, on the other hand,
has postponed its plan.
In the remaining part of this section and the next one,
the states that could occur in 2008 and 2010 are desig-
nated by A and B, respectively. In order to compare the
equilibria of the 2008 and 2010 analyses, one should
compare the results of the 2010 conflict:
 (N N N, N N): state B1, SEQ,
 (N Y N, N Y): state B11, Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ.
with the results of 2008:
 (N Y N, N N): state A3, GMR, SMR,
 (N Y N, Y N): state A7, Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ.Table 9 Reachable states
State FG OG
1 2, 3, 4 5, 9
2 1, 3, 4 6, 10
3 1, 2, 4 7, 11
4 1, 2, 3 8, 12
5 6, 7, 8 1, 9
6 5, 7, 8 2, 10
7 5, 6, 8 3, 11
8 5, 6, 7 4, 12
9 10, 11, 12 1, 5
10 9, 11, 12 2, 6
11 9, 10, 12 3, 7
12 9, 10, 11 4, 8State B11 is a very strong equilibrium since it is Nash
stable. This state is somewhat similar to state A7 in the
2008 analysis. State A7 is also Nash stable and is a stron-
ger equilibrium than state A3. Therefore, the relation-
ship between the results of the two conflicts can be
listed below:
 States A1 and B1 constitute similar states which are
the initial states of the 2008 and 2010 conflicts,
respectively.
 State B2 (which is similar to A3) is a transition
equilibrium in the 2010 conflict and the equilibrium
of the 2008 conflict.
 State A7 or B11 are the strong equilibria in both
conflicts.
Now the question that needs to be addressed is why is
state A7 not the finishing point of the 2008 analysis?
The answer is that state A7 (or B11) are actually the
equilibria, but state A3 is a very considerable transition
state. This nuclear conflict is very complicated since the
DMs have changed their decisions on several occasions.
That is why the conflict moved from state A7 to A3 in
the 2008 conflict (Table 4).
Status Quo analysis
To investigate how the conflict evolves and moves from
its 2008 state, state A1 or B1, to state B11, status quo
analysis is performed. In a status quo analysis, one deter-
mines if a state of interest can be reached following a
path from a starting or status quo state. The evolution
of the conflict is shown in Table 11.
State B2, which is equivalent to state A3, is the transi-
tion state. State A3 is the ending point of the 2008 con-
flict, but can be considered as a starting point of the
2010 conflict. The status quo table of the 2-DM 2008
conflict (Table 4) can be compared to Table 11. Al-
though the initial state is shown to be state 1 in Table 11,
this state is actually the very first point of the conflict in
2008. Therefore, state A1 is the initial state of the 2008
conflict, and state A3 (B2) is its ending. Finally, state
Table 12 Tabular representation of attitudes in a regular
2-DM game
Player 1 Player 2
Player 1 e11 = + e21 = 0
Player 2 e21 = 0 e22 = +
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son for the difference between the two stages of the con-
flict (2008 and 2010) is the available information. Hence,
one can understand how the changes in the situation
over time can affect the final result.Attitude analysis
Attitude analysis (Inohara et al., 2007; Bernath Walker
et al. 2009) is another analysis that is performed on this
conflict. In the original form of static analysis, each DM
is considered to have a positive attitude towards him/
herself, and to be neutral towards other DMs. This
means that each DM does not carry out an action that
harms him/herself, but may move to a state that harms
or benefits other DMs. The way DMs’ attitudes can be
shown is indicated in Table 12. The symbol eij ∈ {−, 0, +},
i, j = 1, . . . , n, where n is the number of players, denotes
the attitude of player i towards player j. eij = −, eij = 0,
eij = + indicate negative, neutral, and positive attitudes
towards the opponent, respectively. Table 12 also shows
the attitudes of players in the original form of static
analysis.
It is worth noting that the analysis that is shown in
Table 10 is performed by taking into consideration the
attitude set indicated in Table 12. However, another set
of attitudes may be assumed in this game. Two different
governments constitute the DMs in this conflict. The
Federal Government is run by the Conservative Party of
Canada, and the Ontario Government is run by the Lib-
eral Party. Therefore, aside from the situation of the
Ontario contract and the future of AECL, the game
involves the political conflicts between these two politic-
ally opposed DMs. According to the background of the
conflict, after the Ontario Government announced that
it favoured AECL’s proposal, the Federal Government
announced the restructuring of the company. The im-
plementation of a new nuclear station in Ontario is a
vital requirement for the province. However, although
the Federal Government is keen on being a pioneer inTable 11 Evolution of 2010 conflict
Federal Government
1. Sell AECL to a foreign company N FG Y Y FG N
→ →
2. Sell AECL to a Canadian company N N N FG Y
→
3. Support AECL N N N N
Ontario Government
4. Buy from a foreign company N N N N
5. Buy from AECL N N OG Y Y
→
1 2 10 11nuclear technology, it seems that it does not have a plan
to help Ontario in this matter, and this may be the rea-
son for the political conflicts. Therefore, a new attitude
arrangement (Table 13) is considered, and a new static
analysis is performed (Table 14). According to the atti-
tudes in Table 12, from each state, FG can move to a
state among the reachable states that is less preferred by
OG and more preferred by itself. OG can move to the
states that are more preferred by itself, ignoring FG’s
preference. The corresponding unilateral moves to each
state are indicated below the ranking of states for each
DM in Table 14.
With the new set of attitudes, three states are found as
the equilibria of the conflict, states 4, 10, and 11. State
10 represents the situation in which FG sells AECL to a
foreign company, and OG buys reactors from AECL.
State 4 is a state in which the Federal Government sup-
ports AECL, and the Ontario Government decides not
to buy any new reactor. State 11 represents the situation
in which FG sells AECL to a domestic company, and
OG buys reactors from AECL. The results show that if,
in reality, the Federal Government has the intention of
harming the Ontario Government, and at the same time,
benefitting itself, it is possible that the final outcome of
the game is state 4, which is among the least preferred
states for both DMs.
Conclusions
The dispute over the expansion of the Darlington nu-
clear site in Ontario is formally studied in this paper for
two different points in time: the fall of 2008 and spring
of 2010. According to the background information about
this conflict in 2008, four DMs were considered to be
involved in the game: the Federal and Ontario Govern-
ments, AECL, and green groups. However, after several
sensitivity analyses, the authors arrived at the conclusion
that the key DMs are the Federal and Ontario Govern-
ments. The status quo analysis is also provided and the
evolution of the conflict from March to fall 2008 is
explained. The conflict did not terminate at this point
and is still ongoing. The results and information of theTable 13 Attitudes in the new analysis
FG OG
FG e11 = + e12 = 0
OG e21 = − e22 = +
Table 14 Stability Analysis (e11 = e22 = +, e12 = −, e21 = 0)
Overall Equilibria E E × × × × × × × × E ×
Individual Stability r r r r s u r u u u r r
FG State Ranking 11 10 9 2 3 1 6 7 5 12 4 8
2 3 6 7 9
2 6 11
10
Individual Stability r r r r s u u u u r u u
OG State Ranking 12 1 11 10 5 7 6 3 2 4 8 9
1 11 10 7 6 12 4 1
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Figure 1 Applying the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
(based on Fang et al. (1993)).
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are used to perform another analysis in 2010. Only the
two governments are counted as the main DMs at this
time, and their options have changed from the situation
in 2008. The equilibria found in this analysis for 2010
suggest that the conflict will ultimately move to a state
in which the Federal Government sells AECL to a do-
mestic company, and the Ontario Government buys its
reactors from AECL or its new CANDU owner. The
other outcome is the initial state, in which no DM takes
any action. This state actually was stable in reality for a
period of time. So far, the results are closely correlated
with what happened in reality, as the Federal Govern-
ment sold AECL to SNC-Lavalin, a Canadian company
(Babbage, 2011; McCarthy, 2011). The decision of the
Ontario Government is still unknown, but the analyses
suggest that Ontario will buy its reactors from AECL. In
addition, in the attitude analysis, it is discovered that if
the Federal Government has a negative attitude towards
the Ontario Government, it is possible that the final out-
come is a state that is among the least preferred states
for both DMs.
Methods
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is
the approach that is used to analyze this conflict. The
GMCR methodology was developed by Fang et al. (1993)
based upon earlier work by Fraser and Hipel (1984) and
Howard (1971). This decision technology can be used to
analyze disputes among different parties with different
options or decision choices, and different preferences or
value systems. It is for this reason that this methodology
has been chosen to be used in this research. GMCR
constitutes a flexible approach to the representation,
analysis, and understanding of a strategic conflict. It
also facilitates modifications to the way in which the
conflict is represented, thereby supporting sensitivity
and what-if analyses. Finally, descriptions and compari-
sons of a range of different approaches for formally
studying conflict are provided in two books edited by
Hipel (2009a,b).GMCR is able to provide a DM with suggestions for
reaching possible resolutions either independently or in
cooperation with others. In some cases, win/win resolu-
tions can be reached even though this may initially ap-
pear to be difficult to achieve. Figure 1 illustrates the
way in which a conflict study is carried out in practice.
GMCR, along with its associated decision support sys-
tem GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a,b; Hipel et al., 1997), is
used to model the conflict and analyze the current
situation.
The most important part of applying the GMCR
model to a real-world conflict is the background investi-
gation. Searching the news, talking to experts, and read-
ing the related published articles help the analyst acquire
a proper understanding of a conflict and develop a real-
istic model. Therefore, accurate and comprehensive in-
formation plays a fundamental role. In fact, the whole
“Modeling” section, as shown in Figure 1, as well as the
“Interpretation and Sensitivity” stage in the “Analysis”
part, directly depends on the analyst’s findings. In other
words, the analyst determines the DMs, their options,
infeasible states, and relative preferences. The analyst’s
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and the interpretations and suggestions to actual DMs
for an ongoing conflict depend on the available data. In
some cases, the analyst may work directly with a DM or
the DM’s representative involved in a dispute, while in
other situations, he or she may be working with an inter-
ested stakeholder who has no direct decision-making
power in influencing the dispute under study but is
affected by its outcome.
Decision makers, options, feasible states, and allowable
state transitions
To use the graph model methodology, one must first
model the dispute in terms of the DMs. A DM is a per-
son or a group who plays a role in a conflict and has
one or more decisions to make, or alternatives to
choose. Besides the DMs and options, states should be
defined. A state is any combination of chosen options. A
sample state, under the name of Status Quo, is shown in
Table 1. The letter “Y” means that the DM selects an op-
tion under its control, while “N” denotes the refusal of a
DM to choose the option. A dash (“-”) indicates that for
the DM to choose or not to choose an option is inconse-
quential. Some states cannot occur in reality. These
states are considered “infeasible” and have to be
removed from the conflict.
After determining the feasible states, the allowable
transitions should be determined. From each state, a
specific DM can only move to a certain set of states.
This set, which is referred to as a DM’s Reachable List,
consists of the states in which other DMs’ choices, in-
cluding Y, N, or -, are not different from the initial state.
When a DM on his/her own moves from one state to
another, this move is called a unilateral move. If the state
to which the DM moves to is more preferred by him or
her, the move is called a “unilateral improvement”.
Relative preferences and static analysis
After generating a complete set of feasible states, the
analyst must determine the relative preferences, in




Nash DM cannot move unilaterally
to a more preferred state
Low
SEQ All DM’s unilateral improvements
are sanctioned by subsequent
unilateral improvements by others
Medium
GMR All DM’s unilateral Improvements
are sanctioned by subsequent
unilateral moves by others
Medium
SMR All DM’s unilateral improvements
are sanctioned, even after response by the DM
Mediumpreferred, where ties are allowed. Three methods can be
used in GMCR II to define the relative preferences of
each DM: Direct Ranking, Option Weighting, and Op-
tion Prioritizing.
Subsequently, according to a rich range of solution
concepts describing how people or organizations may
behave under conflict, a stability analysis of the conflict
is carried out to calculate the stable states for each DM.
A state that is stable for all DMs in the dispute is called
an equilibrium, which suggests a possible resolution to
the conflict.
A range of stability definitions have been defined for
determining stable states in a dispute in which it is not
advantageous for a DM to move away from a state under
study. The four useful stability definitions given in
Table 15 consist of Nash (Nash, 1950, 1951), sequential
(Fraser and Hipel, 1984), general metarationality (GMR)
(Howard, 1971), and symmetric metarationality (SMR)
(Howard, 1971). Qualitative explanations of how each
stability definition works along with its overall character-
istics are provided in Table 15, while Fang et al. (1993)
furnish mathematical definitions within the paradigm of
GMCR. When a state is stable for all of the DMs accord-
ing to a specific stability definition, the state constitutes
an equilibrium or possible compromise resolution.
Interpretation and sensitivity analysis
After carrying out a stability analysis, one may perform
appropriate sensitivity analyses. In this case, the DMs,
the options, or the relative preferences can be changed
to obtain a better understanding of the issue and ascer-
tain how the equilibrium results are affected.
There are also other types of analyses that can be car-
ried out within the GMCR framework to interpret the
results, including attitudes (Inohara et al., 2007; Bernath
Walker et al. 2009), coalitions (Kilgour et al., 2001;
Inohara and Hipel, 2008a,b), strength of preference
(Hamouda et al., 2004, 2006; Xu et al., 2009a), misper-
ceptions (called hypergames) (Wang et al., 1988), emo-
tions (Obeidi et al., 2005, 2006, 2009a, 2009b),





Own Never Ignores risk
All Never Takes some risks
Own By opponent Avoids risks
Own By opponent Avoids risks
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calculations (Xu et al., 2009b). By applying different ana-
lyses, the outcomes can be more deeply interpreted and
additional strategic insights may be achieved.
Endnotes
aAfter NRU restarted in January 2008, another shut-
down happened in 2009. On May 14, 2009, NRU was
shut down due to a loss of electrical power in Ontario.
On May 15, when the experts were investigating the re-
actor, they observed a small leak of heavy water within
the facility. Therefore, the NRU was kept out of service
for repair (AECL, 2009). On August 17, 2010, the NRU
was returned to operation (NRU Canada, 2010). The
performance of NRU, as an important supplier of med-
ical isotopes in the world, is critical, and the repeated
shutdowns of this reactor diminished the reputation of
AECL, the company responsible for it.
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